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Is Organ Reanimation
a Better Mousetrap?
Presented at LL U Ethics Grand Rounds on January 10, 1996
Robert D. Orr, MD

The major successes of transplantation using organs from
donors declared dead by neurological criteria have resulted
in a situation where the demand for replacement organs seriously outstrips the supply from voluntary organ donation.
Each month the waiting list of potential recipients grows,
and each day patients die because no organs are available for
them. Proposals and efforts have been made to increase the
supply of organs by changing the procurement system or by
expanding the number and type of donors.

Expanding the number and type of donors
Live donors have been used (related and non-related
adults, occasionally children) for non-vital organ donation.
Live-born infants with anencephaly have been proposed as
"donors" of vital organs, and animal organs have also been
used experimentally. Prisoners facing execution have occasionally volunteered to be donors, but their organs have not
been used for several reasons. Non-heart-beating-cadaver
donors (NHBCO's) are another possibility.

Changing the procurement system
Technical and ethical concerns
The federal government has instituted "required
request,'" in that hospitals may not forego asking families of
potential donors if they are willing to consent, but this has
not appreciably increased the organ supply. Some countries
in Europe and South America have instituted policies of
"presumed consent" Z in that any dead person is a donor
unless he or she has specifically declined beforehand, and
this has had some positive impact. An alternative which
might be more acceptable in the individualistic North
American scene is "mandated choice" 3 which would require
each adult to make a decision for or against donation, most
likely on his or her driver's license. In some other countries,
donors can be paid for non-vital organs, but this remains
strictly illegal in the U.S. There are also proposals to offer
monetary incentives to families who give consent or to medical professionals who are able to secure the consent.

Whatever method is used, and from whomever organs
are to be retrieved, we must be aware of the technical
obstacles and ethical concerns surrounding organ retrieval
and donation. Technically, the problems involve the determination of death (the concept, definition, and specific cri-

On the last page of this issue:

Register for the February
Conference

teria) and the deterioration of organs which happens when
they remain at body temperature without any circulation
(the warm ischemia time). The ethical concerns include
continuation of humane and dignified care for dying
patients and compassionate care for their families. It is also
considered important not to compromise the care of the person who is dying for the benefit of a potential recipient, and
to treat the newly dead body with respect.

preservation solution is then instituted to reduce the warm
ischemia time. This perfusion may be continued for several hours before organ retrieval is accomplished. It was
initially proposed that consent for the retrieval would be
obtained before perfusion was begun. This would have
met few, if any, ethical objections. However, major logistical problems of obtaining consent within the few minutes
available immediately after death made it impossible to
retrieve organs in this fashion. An alternative proposed by
Non-heart-beating-cadaver donors
the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois was to begin cold perfusion without consent in order to preserve for the family
It is dogma that we do not retrieve vital organs for transthe option of donation, which could then be discussed durplantation from individuals before
ing the next few hours.
they are dead. Most organs used in
This proposal raises several
HThis proposal would allow the
transplantation today are taken from
ethical objections. The objecindividuals who are declared dead
patient's family to remain with the tion which is most unique in this
using neurological criteria, because
clinical situation is the use of a
patient during the dying process." non-therapeutic invasive procethe vital organs can be preserved by
continued perfusion until the proper
dure without consent. Many
time for retrieval; i.e., the heart-beating cadaver is continbelieve this constitutes disrespectful treatment of a recently dead body. This same objection has been raised in relaued on organ support (not "life support"). However, when
tion to dissection of human corpses by medical students
transplantation was first introduced in the 1960s, neurological criteria had not yet been developed and organs were
and post-mortem autopsy to determine the cause of death.
retrieved from cadavers after declaration of death by stanThese procedures have come to be generally acceptable in
most cultural settings since it is felt that the potential bendard cardiopulmonary criteria, i.e. non-heart-beating cadavers. There has been recent interest in reviewing this potenefit to others out-weighs the potential disrespect to the
tial source of organs. Several proposals have been introdeceased. Practicing endotracheal intubation on recently
duced to do this, but some of them raise concerns about disdead patients, although not disfiguring, continues to be
tortion of the technical matters, and some ignore the ethical
discomfiting to some and an item of ethical discussion.
concerns mentioned above.
When in situ cold perfusion is done prior to obtaining
In situ cold perfusion has been proposed as a way to
consent, the consent process may still be somewhat hurried
retrieve solid organs from NHBCO's after sudden, unexfor the acutely grieving family, though perhaps no more so
pected death, usually in the emergency room.4 In this prothan in many instances of retrieval from heart-beating
cadaver donors. This proposal also raises the question of
posal, death is declared using standard cardiopulmonary criteria. Intravascular and intraperitoneal perfusion of cold
whether the members of the family of the deceased will be
informed of the cold perfusion if they decline organ donation. In addition, the rapid transition from life-saving therADMINISTRATIVE
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Controlled death

In some situations, the time and place of death may be
controlled in such a manner as to minimize warm ischemia
and optimize conditions for organ retrieval, for example,
after a decision has been made by the patient or family to
withdraw life support with the expectation that the patient
will die. Unhurried consent may be obtained between the
time of the decision to withdraw treatment and the actual
implementation of that decision.
Update Volume 12, Number 3

A protocol to retrieve organs in such situations has
been instituted in Pittsburgh. 5 At the appropriate time,
the patient is moved to the operating room and is
.,- prepped and draped for surgery. . Life support is dis) co~tinued with the orga.n retri.eval team waiting in. an
. adjacent room. Death IS awaIted and declared usmg
newly developed cardiac criteria, and the organs are
retrieved. This proposal was developed methodically
over a period of four years with extensive internal and
external review. It is quite conservative regarding
issues of consent, conflicts of interest, documentation,
and review of the decisions. It departs dramatically
from medical tradition, however, in its drastic redefinition of death as "two minutes of pulselessness" which
may include asystole, ventricular fibrillation, or electromechanical disassociation. These new criteria for death
have been called "gerrymandering,"6 "policy creep," 7
and "an ignoble form of cannibalism."8 It has been
pointed out that the hearts retrieved in this manner do
not meet the irreversibility criteria of the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (UDDA). For instance,
these cardiac criteria for death would not be used or
acceptable if applied to the potential recipient; heroic
efforts would likely be used to resuscitate a patient
awaiting an organ if he or she demonstrated ventricular
fibrillation. Defenders of the protocol insist that these
criteria were developed because of the exceedingly low
probability of auto resuscitation, however, this defense
has been criticized because little empiric data is offered
to support their contention.
In addition to this major departure from accepted
medical standards, the proposal involves separation of
the family from the patient during the dying process
and immediately after death. It also raises the difficulty of predicting the time of death, so both family and
procurement team may have a protracted wait while
separated from the patient, and occasionally patients
survive such withdrawal of life support. Again, the
effect on public acceptance of organ donation is
unknown, but it is not unreasonable to expect that persons unfamiliar with the details of or reasoning behind
the procedure would perceive this hurried retrieval as
very discomfiting.
Reanimation is an alternative method of organ
retrieval which has been performed successfully in
lambs and baboons here at Lorna Linda. After being
anesthetized, paralyzed, and extubated, the donor animals demonstrated pulselessness in 7 (+ 1) minutes,
and asystole followed 9-18 minutes later. The asystolic
animals were left undisturbed for 15-31 minutes after
which heart retrieval was performed and transplantation was done into recipient animals. All hearts
returned to sinus rhythm without the use of inotropes.
Follow-up showed good myocardial function and no
significant ischemic damage.
Reanimation is proposed for situations where a decision is made by patient or family to withdraw life support with the expectation that the patient will die. This
process will allow adequate time for unhurried consent,
as does the Pittsburgh protocol. Under this proposal,
Update Volume 12, Number 3

however, life support will be discontinued in the Intensive
Care Unit, and standard cardiac criteria will then be used to
declare death. After death is declared, the body may be left
undisturbed at room temperature for 20-30 minutes (or
longer). Organs may then be retrieved right in the ICU.
This proposal would allow the patient's family to remain
with the patient during the dying process and for several
minutes of personal grieving immediately after death, without being disturbed by the procurement team.
The objection to this proposal could be raised, as in the
Pittsburgh protocol, that these donors are not dead because
they do not have "irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory function" as required by the UDDA. Certainly
the reanimated hearts function normally and are therefore
not irreversibly dead. The significant difference, however,
is that the accepted medical standard for management of an
individual with prolonged absence of cardiopulmonary
function is to declare the person dead without resuscitative
efforts. The Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining
Treatment and the Care of the Dying published by the Hastings
Center in 1987 state: "complete cessation of circulation to
the normothermic adult brain for more than ten minutes is
incompatible with survival of brain tissue."
Criteria for the declaration of death prior to retrieval of
hearts in the reanimation procedure are consistent with
those proposed by Bernat, Culver, and Gert in 1981. 9 These
authors observe that the UDDA allows two separate and
equal criteria for death. They contend that conceptually all
death is brain death, and they propose an alternative statute
which would read:
"An individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem, is dead. (a)
In the absence of artificial means of cardiopulmonary support,
death may be determined by the prolonged absence of spontaneous
circulatory and respiratory functions. (b) In the presence of artificial means of cardiopulmonary support, death must be determined by tests of brain function. In both situations, the determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical
standards. "
Although this proposal has greater conceptual clarity
than the UDDA, the advantage of uniformity among states
obtained by following the wording of the UDDA outweighs
the potential advantage of attempting to change.
Conclusion
We believe that the proposal for retrieval of solid organs
from NHBCD's using this reanimation approach offers several ethical advantages. First, consent is obtained before
the protocol is instituted, a major advantage over the in situ
cold preservation proposal. Second, using the standard definition of death and accepted standards for declaration of
death offers an advantage over the Pittsburgh protocol. We
further believe that arranging the retrieval in a manner that
will allow the family to be with the patient during and after
death is a compassionate measure which will be appreciated by families and may lessen the potential impact of such
a protocol on the general public.
(continued on page 4)
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Reanimation of Dead Hearts
Steven R. Gundry, MD
these infants alive should not be the issue, but rather
The most important factor facing organ transplantation
where
to find additional donors.
in the United States is the shortage of donor organs. With
There
is another set of donors who at present are only
the introduction of Cyclosporine and other new anti-rejecpotential
donors.
These patients are for the most part neution drugs in the 1980's, transplantation of numerous organs
rologically
"dead"
but do not fully qualify as "brain-dead"
initially skyrocketed. Unfortunately, organ transplantation
by
standard
criteria.
They have sustained a major neurohas plateaued in number since 1990, despite a massive
logic
insult
and
either
have a living will or because of famincrease in waiting lists for patients needing transplantaily's
wishes
are
allowed
to die a compassionate death, usution. In fact, every year approximately 31,000 patients
ally
by
extubating
and
allowing
them to become hypoxic
await organ transplantation of some type, yet only about
and
suffer
cardiac
arrest.
Unfortunately,
many of these
15,000 transplants are done per year. This is all the more
patients
have
perfectly
usable
organs,
particularly
heart or
unfortunate since an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 people die
kidneys,
but
these
organs
are
not
rouevery year in circumstances that
tinely used because the patient is
would allow successful donation
and transplantation of their "Some hearts, even after two hours dead and the organ would be
assumed to be nonviable. We believe
organs, yet only about 4,500
of arrest and CPR, can be
the hypothesis that these organs
patients per year actually
reanimated and support the
would fare poorly is quite frankly
become organ donors.
donor circulation."
wrong. We have become convinced
The impact of this shortage
of this over the years we have done
has been particularly felt here at
heart transplantation, harvesting hearts from infants, chilLorna Linda with our infant heart transplantation program.
dren and adults who have had significant periods of cardiac
A few years ago one of our fellows, Mario Chiavarelli, folarrest and cardiopulmonary resuscitation prior to being harlowed 111 newborn infants who were registered for heart
vested. Remarkably, some hearts, even after two hours of
transplantation at Lorna Linda. As is our policy, families
arrest and CPR, can be reanimated and support the donor
are given the option of having their infants await transplancirculation. Unfortunately for the donor during this time
tation here at our hospital or at another hospital until the
period, the brain usually becomes hypoxic and is not resusdonor organ becomes available. Of the 58 patients that
citated. These hearts can be harvested and have done
were kept at Lorna Linda, 12% died while awaiting a transextremely well as donors. Longterm function of these
plant while 88% were successfully transplanted. In conhearts is not any different than donors that have never had
trast to that, of the 53 patients who were kept at other hosa cardiac arrest.
pitals, only 62% were successfully transplanted while 38%
Beginning in 1990, we developed a series of laboratory
died while awaiting. In fact, nationwide, upwards of 30experiments to determine whether or not our hypothesis
40% of infants awaiting transplantation die before a donor
was correct-that hearts from clinically dead patients withis identified. While this figure is very disheartening and
out a heartbeat (better known as non-heart beating donors)
shows the clear problem in organ donation, it also points up
could be reanimated and used successfully in other perthe superb job the Lorna Linda neonatologists have done
sons. Lambs were used in which lamb donors were anesin keeping these critical infants alive for many months
thetized, then paralyzed, and allowed to die a hypoxic
while awaiting donor organs. Sadly, the ability to keep
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death. Usually, it took from eight to twelve minutes to
obtain cardiac asystole following extubation, and at that
point the lambs were allowed to lie undisturbed for another 30 minutes. Their hearts were then harvested and treated with a cold cardioplegia preservative solution. Shortly
thereafter an additional set of lambs was placed on cardiopulmonary bypass and were then transplanted with
these dead hearts. The dead hearts were reperfused using
reperfusion modifications. Remarkably, all hearts were
capable of supporting the circulation of these animals without inotropic support or medications to improve heart function.
We repeated these experiments in lambs that were
exsanguinated, simulating trauma patients who hemorrhage from an auto accident or knife or gunshot wounds,
and arrive in the Emergency Room dead. In the same scenario, these hearts, even after being dead for up to 45 minutes, could also be completely reanimated when used as a
donor organ in a second animal. Spurred by our success in
this area, last year we repeated the hypoxic experiments on
non-human primates to determine if our observations in a
lower species of animal could be duplicated in a sub-human

primate. To our delight, all the primates who were transplanted with "dead" donor organs were successfully reanimated and all survived, coming off the heart/lung machine
on no inotropic support and being extubated immediately
after the operation.
This important information has given us encouragement
to proceed with investigations as to how this could be
applied to human organ donation. There are a large number of ethical and legal issues that must be surmounted,
including the legal definition of death as irreversible cessation of heartbeat. If a heart that has stopped in one person
who is declared legally dead, is subsequently put into
another person and begins beating, was the first person
legally dead? Bioethics must address this question. •

Steven R. Gundry, MD
Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery
Professor, School of Medicine
Loma Linda University

Reanimation Dialogue
The following discussion took place at Loma Linda's Ethics Grand Rounds on January 10, 1996. David Larson, PhD, codirector of the LL U Center for Christian Bioethics, served as moderator for the questions asked of the two speakers, Robert Orr,
MD, director of clinical ethics at LL U and Steven Gundry, MD, chief of cardiothoracic surgery at LL U.

If I understand things correctly, both ofyou are persuaded that the
approach being considered at LL U has some ethical and legal
advantages over approaches now in place elsewhere and that
reanimation would conform to the Uniform Determination of
Death Act. Is that a fair summary of what is underwayP

Gundry and Orr: Yes.
Would this apply to both conscious and unconscious donorsP

Gundry: There is no reason why it couldn't be in either,
depending on the family's and patient's wishes.
Orr: We would have to be careful to address the needs of
the person who is dying. As when we now stop the ventilator in a person with some degree of consciousness, we
assure that person, ourselves, and the family that we give
adequate sedation so that they are unaware of the sensation of not being able to breathe adequately.
What does one say to the person who claims that the donor was
not really dead if it is possible to start up his or her heart in
another individual's bodyP

Orr: Even though we declare the time of death by the
heart stopping, we are waiting a period of time to be sure
the whole person is dead. The Uniform Determination of
Death Act says that death must be declared using standard
clinical criteria. The standard treatment for a person who
has been down without any circulation for 20 or 30 minutes
Update Volume 12, Number 3

is nothing, because we know that person is dead.
What do we say to those who claim that the 20 or 30 minutes of
down time was orchestrated and had this not been done the person
would still be aliveP

Orr: They are absolutely right. We currently orchestrate
retrieval of organs by brain death criteria because of the
timing and the sequence and so on. It is very similar.
You mentioned that DNR orders would have to be reversed. For
what purposeP

Orr: Usually the time from getting consent to actually
retrieving the organs would be more than a few minuteshours to perhaps the next day. During that time, if you
actually wanted to retrieve that heart, you would do everything you could to preserve it. You could negotiate with the
family. If they decide not to do it you could accept their
position. But if you are really going to try to retrieve that
heart, you have to withdraw the DNR order and work hard
to keep that heart healthy.
Who is going to educate the families about this new criteria if we
aren't clear on the present guidelinesP

Orr: That is a very insightful question and this is a major
problem. One of the reasons why we have fewer organ
donors than we might is because there is considerable misconception over the concept of brain death. We are trying
5

to get away from the name "brain death" because it implies
a different kind of death; death by neurological criteria is a
better name. We should do a better job of education in that
area as well. Moving in this direction is going to require
some major education efforts with staff as well as the public so people realize we are really following good, rigid clinical and conceptual criteria.

is no difference in how the hearts do. We feel the advantage of this technique is that the donor could be allowed to
die in the presence of the family; for example, if the donor
is a child, the family would be able to hold the child and
have the child die in their arms. The harvest could then
take place in a fairly non-hurried fashion and this would
have a tremendous benefit for the family.

There is currently fundingfor research but is there fundingfor this
kind of educationP Is there any surgical advantage to goingfrom
20 minutes down to 10 minutesP If there isn't, then it seems like
there would be a tremendous political advantage to waiting the
full 20 minutes.

You said that you are up to 45 minutes--is that a final plateau
or is a longer time still possibleP

Orr: We really need to include cost of education in
research proposals if we are going to be doing something
clinical that IS innovative. It is a legitimate research
expense.
Ifprotocols are being used at other centers, and you feel those protocols are probably less defensible ethically and legally than those
being proposed at LL U, what are we waiting forP

Gundry: The other centers are doing organs with the
exception of the heart-mostly kidneys and an occasional
liver. We were ready to attempt reanimation a few years
ago and again last fall, but the problem with the heart is a
legal one. Our attorneys tell us that some bright young district attorney could use The Uniform Declaration of Death
Act and say that we took the heart out and proved
reversible cessation of heart function by reanimating it in
someone else and therefore are guilty of manslaughter.
That is not the same as letting someone else die even for
two minutes and taking out their organs except for their
heart because their heart is in fact irreversibly dead since
they didn't bother to use it. So it is this silly law about irreversible cessation of heartbeat that is the catch-22, and why
the other centers can, if you will, "get away with it."

Gundry: Forty-five minutes is the current limit, but not
the final limit. We are not going to spend the time and
money to increase the upper time limit until we find out if
we are going to be allowed to perform this procedure.
Orr: What I didn't understand clearly until Dr. Gundry's
presentation today is that retroprofusion is no longer done
when you retrieve a heart from a brain dead cadaver. So
that is the new part; is that correct?
Gundry: We thought that was the key to the procedure,
but then we eliminated the retroprofusion and it still
worked.
You mentioned that you want to keep the person who counsels the
family about the decision to withdraw life support and the person
who encourages the family to donate their loved one's organs separate. How do you plan to do thatP

Orr: The decisions need to be separate in time. It is the
sequence that is important. We don't want aggressive
transplant surgeons approaching a family and pressuring
them to donate organs. Only after the family decides that
their loved one is reaching the end of life and life support
should be withdrawn should the family be approached
about donation of organs .•

All hearts that are transplanted, of course, are reanimated if they
are successful. The real question is, how can we be certain that
brain death has occurred.?

Gundry: That's right. But all hearts that are currently harvested are from, we assume, brain dead donors. The criteria for brain death are loose from state to state-there is no
uniform criteria for brain death determination.
Except that no one would doubt that an individual whose heart
has been stillfor twenty minutes has expired, am I correct in thatP

Gundry: Yes, no one would doubt that except for some
bright young district attorney who wanted his name in the
paper.
There is a point at which the line for optimal time to remove the
heart and the line that agreement that death has occurred cross
each other. Dr. Orr has suggested that 10 minutes may be long
enough.

***Now Available***
From The University of Illinois Press

Choosing Whos to Live:
Ethics and Aging
Edited by James W. Walters
Publication Date: September 3, 1996
Price: Cloth, $29.95

Paper, $16.95
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Gundry: When we began these experiments we started at
10 minutes and worked our way up to 45 minutes. There
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James W. Walters Publishes Second Book
on Ethics and Aging
By Douglas B. Kasischke
Earlier this year, James W. Walters,
Professor of Christian Ethics at Loma
Linda University, published Choosing Whos
to Live: Ethics and Aging. This is his second
book on ethics and aging. It follows close
on the heels (only three years) of Walter's
first book on the subject, Facing Limits:
Ethics and Health Care for the Elderly, which he edited along
with LLU Faculty of Religion Dean Gerald R. Winslow.
Both books, which are products of two conferences on
ethics and aging held in Loma Linda, seek to expand discourse on the subject, and respond to arguments forwarded
by philosopher Daniel Callahan. The earlier project primarily explored different aspects of issues surrounding
health care for the aged. The latest book, however, is an
effort less topically diverse, but more self-conscious about
expanding debate on the subject.
In 1987 Daniel Callahan's book entitled, Setting Limits:
Medical Goals in an Aging Society, set the terms for debate
over health care allocation. He reminded his readers that a
disproportionate number of people are reaching retirement
age in a society where medical resources are scarce. In his
view, this mandates a fundamental shift in thinking on
what constitutes a life well lived. Elderly people and society, Callahan suggested, should accept limits on a normal
life-span. Death at approximately eighty years of age
would constitute what he saw as a tolerable death. Thus,
at around eighty years of age, the elderly would forgo life
saving treatment (even antibiotics) for the good of society,
dying shortly thereafter. Medical resources saved would
then go to benefit younger generations. Through health
care rationing, a balance could be struck between the competing needs of different generations.
With Callahan's perspective articulated, the bioethics
community (among others) clamored to respond. Walters'
books represent two aspects of this response. Both were
the offspring of national conferences on health care and
ethics. The first conference, organized by Walters in 1990
with the help of a grant from the National Endowment for
the Humanities, involved a wide range of presenters and
was geared especially toward the public. From it came
Facing Limits in 1993. One year later, with money left over
from the first conference, Walters put on a second event,
compiled the essays presented at that conference, and published Choosing Who s to Live.
Of the two books, Choosing, like the conference that preceded it, is the more academic. Its purpose is "to take this
crucial debate [health care and ethics] beyond Callahan
,\into the next round of discussion." Thus, it is a discourse
between scholars, not between scholars and lay readers.
However, the book is not without interest to the lay person. The essays are presented in an order which leads the
Update Volume 12, Number 3

reader along a path to the "next round of discussion." With
only three sections-"Justifications," "Applications," and
"Reflections,"-the path is relatively easy to follow.
For justifications, Walters provides two essays: one by
Paul T. Menzel and the other by Norman Daniels. While
both offer various takes on a "prudential" model for health
care rationing, Menzel offers a helpful opening essay which
introduces the reader to various aspects of the debate over
health care rationing. Although much of the rationing
debate focuses on models that emphasize justice for individuals or community, answers may be found in posing a
"prudential consent" model that honors individual choice
for future care.
Daniels provides a second perspective on the prudential
approach described by Menzel.
His approach is more
detailed, and encourages a "prudential lifespan account"
that incorporates a more cosmopolitan global perspective.
Though Daniels distinguishes between himself and
Menzel, and each essay stands on its own, the articles complement each other. Menzel provides an overview of how
the rationing debate works on a theoretical level, and
Daniels provides a detailed example of that theory at work.
In the second section, philosophers Margaret P. Battin
and Nancy Jecker provide applications, or rather, ways in
which the health care rationing debate might interact with
medical practices. Battin discusses euthanasia and possible
relationships between that and the issue at hand. She
argues that certain forms of euthanasia might prove morally useful tools in avoiding health care rationing. However,
there are insidious kinds of euthanasia, such as those practiced in Nazi Germany, that health care rationing could
become.
One of the dangers in health care rationing is that it may
divert attention away from other fundamental aspects of
care for certain groups. Jecker argues that in discussing
rationing of acute (lifesaving) care for elderly people, we
are ignoring their more fundamental need for long-term
care. To her, this suggests a health care establishment
indifferent to the real needs of the elderly, especially elderly women who predominately rely on long-term care.
Rationing care for the elderly should not be the issue, but
we should analyze how resources might be effectively
directed towards long-term care.
By presenting apt examples of theoretical and practical
approaches to issues surrounding ethics and aging Walters
prepares the reader for the third section of this book. He
presents two more essays analyzing and critiquing bioethics
and its approach to aging and ethics. In various ways, both
attack underlying assumptions permeating discourse on the
subject.
The fifth essay is authored by sociologist Carroll Estes
and two associates. They suggest that attitudes about the
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elderly and the place of health care in our lives are socially
constructed realities, informed by "the present social, cultural, political, and economic environment." Our perception of a crisis in these matters may be socially constructed
also. Dialogue about the crisis must proceed with awareness
of the social forces that mold and perhaps even create it.
John Kilner weighs in with a final article that expands on
themes in the previous essay. He discusses what he sees as
the political, economic, and religious factors that inform
debate on health care, ethics and aging. Through describing these factors, he demonstrates their existence, implying
that the claims of Estes and company might actually be
valid.
Though Choosing Whos to Live does not demonstrate
debate on ethics and aging "beyond Callahan," it does give
a clear indication of where it might, or at least should, head.
The final essays in the book suggest, for example, that in a

debate of such magnitude, the fundamental ways in which
society assigns meaning and value should be examined. In
his article Kilner asks, "In a country that spends $3 billion
annually on potato chips why would people consider preventing a certain group of patients from obtaining lifesaving / ...
health care to be one of the best ways to save money?"
Perhaps future dialogue on ethics and aging will center on
how much society should spend on potato chips . •

Doug Kasischke, Ethics Student, Graduate Assistant
Loma Linda University
Center for Christian Bioethics.
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